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I. INTRODUCTION 
In an almost circadian rhythm, the American public has become 
accustomed to waking up each morning with breaking news of the Trump 
administration’s changes to the immigration system in the United States.1  
Whether Lilliputian changes or Himalayan overhauls, each policy enacted by 
the administration fundamentally changes what due process means in 
immigration courts.2  In response to President Trump’s efforts to increase 
deportations of migrants3 in this country, many localities have instituted 
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 1.   See Lorella Praeli, The Trump Administration’s Multi-Pronged Assault on Immigrants’ 
Rights, ACLU (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/trump-
administrations-multi-pronged-assault-immigrants-rights [https://perma.cc/6ZA6-QAWM]; see also 
Joshua Barajas, How Trump Has Already Changed Immigration Policy, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 6, 
2019, 12:37 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/how-trump-has-already-changed-
immigration-policy [https://perma.cc/PQY2-R32F].  
 2.   See Jens Manuel Krogstad & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Key Facts About U.S. Immigration 
Policies and Proposed Changes, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/05/17/key-facts-about-u-s-immigration-policies-and-proposed-changes 
[https://perma.cc/243E-N8N7].  
 3.   The word “migrant(s)” is specifically used in this paper instead of any other descriptive term 
(such as “immigrants”) to refer to individuals present in the United States without authorization.  
“Migrant(s)” is a more appropriate term to recognize the struggle that many go through when entering 
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policies to limit cooperation between their officials and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE).4  The Trump administration, as it promised in 
its 2016 campaign,5 shifted its focus to undercutting migrant-inclusive 
initiatives by attempting to condition states’ abilities to secure federal funding 
on whether they act in accord with federal immigration goals.6  Courts around 
the nation have scrutinized these attempts, finding that these efforts violated 
the Constitution.7 
This is the backdrop for the back-and-forth between Trump implementing 
immigration-related spending conditions and the courts subsequently 
invalidating them.  Yet, fortunately for the Trump administration, and 
unfortunately for its dissenters, a panel in the Ninth Circuit recently came to 
a differing conclusion.8  When looking at how jurisdictions that cooperate 
with the Trump administration on immigration were given extra points in their 
grant applications, the panel found, 2–1, that the preferential policy was 
constitutional.9  Although this grant program is a seemingly small piece of the 
overall immigration patchwork, it is a powerful example of the model the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) employs for its immigration goals.10  These 
 
the United States, especially in Trump’s contemporary political environment, because it connotes a 
lack of permanency of residency, which reflects the efforts being made by Trump and his 
administration to expel migrants from this country.  Migrants are consistently having to move around 
in order to hide, seek protection, avoid family separation, and stay safe.  
 4.   Jonathan Allen, U.S. Mayors Decry Trump Sanctuary City Threat, ‘Prepared to Welcome’ 
Migrants, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-
sanctuary-mayors/u-s-mayors-dismiss-trump-sanctuary-city-threat-prepared-to-welcome-migrants-
idUSKCN1RO2E3 [https://perma.cc/C63D-FYW6].  
 5.   Pamela Engel, Trump’s First 100 Days Were Unlike Any We’ve Ever Seen – Here Are All 
the Promises He’s Kept and Broken, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 29, 2017, 7:53 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-first-100-days-promises-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/7BEY-
MT6U] (noting Trump’s campaign promise to end federal funding to “sanctuary cities” in his first 100 
days in office). 
 6.   Suzanne Monyak, 9th Circ. Says DOJ Can Tie Police Funds to Immigration, LAW360 (July 
15, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1178029/9th-circ-says-doj-can-tie-police-
funds-to-immigration [https://perma.cc/UK46-YU88]. 
 7.   See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289, 321 (E.D. Pa. 2018), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 284–91 (3d Cir. 2019); 
City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 283–87 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated in part on other 
grounds,  No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 at *1 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018); New York v. Dep’t of Just., 
343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), overruled by New York v. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 
124 (2d Cir. 2020); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 945–48, 954–55 
(N.D. Cal. 2018), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Barr, 965 
F.3d 753, 766 (9th Cir. 2020); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 874–76 (N.D. Ill. 
2018), aff’d sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 8.   See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 9.   Id. 
 10.   See Miriam Valverde, Despite Efforts, Donald Trump Fails to Cut Funding from Sanctuary 
Cities, POLITIFACT (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/promises/trumpometer/promise/1400/cancel-all-funding-sanctuary-cities/ 
[https://perma.cc/34PY-934B]. 
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policies and programs are part of a broader approach to meet Trump’s goals 
of increasing deportations and reducing both “legal and illegal immigration” 
in the United States.11  Yet, a rarely challenged requirement of the Spending 
Clause in the Constitution could be a new obstacle in the administration’s 
way.  A requirement of the Spending Clause in the Constitution, the 
relatedness requirement,12 has only been cursorily analyzed by courts since it 
was established.13  If the courts analyzed this prong with more force, they 
would likely find the conditions on the Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS) program in the City of Los Angeles v. Barr case violate the 
relatedness prong of the Spending Clause.14 
First, this Comment will analyze immigration law in general, focusing on 
the Immigration and Nationality Act and the regulations that govern laws 
relevant to this Comment’s analysis.  Then, the Comment discusses sanctuary 
cities and sets the stage for an analysis of the Trump administration’s spending 
conditions instituted against cities to foster support for the administration’s 
immigration goals.  With this backdrop, the Comment then discusses the case 
in question, City of Los Angeles v. Barr, ending with the dissent’s transition 
to the relatedness analysis.  Finally, this Comment argues for an increased 
relatedness standard, pursuing three different tests that could strengthen this 
prong of the Spending Clause.  Under any strengthened test, the conditions on 
the City of Los Angeles case would likely be held constitutionally invalid. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  Immigration Law Overview 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), passed in 1952, generally 
governs immigration law in this country.15  The Act sets out the basic body of 
immigration law, including paths to citizenship, such as asylum and visas.16  
Included in the INA are regulations governing the DOJ and the rules for 
 
 11.   Ted Hesson, Trump Administration Expands Scope of Rapid Deportations, POLITICO (July 
22, 2019, 10:23 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/22/trump-administration-immigrant-
deportations-dhs-1607459 [https://perma.cc/VH47-9M6Q].  
 12.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) 
(noting “conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest”). 
 13.  See ANDREW NOLAN, KEVIN M. LEWIS, JAY B. SYKES, WILSON C. FREEMAN, & KEVIN J. 
HICKEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45323, FEDERALISM-BASED LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER: AN OVERVIEW 31  (2018) (noting “most lower courts have given the ‘relatedness’ requirement 
‘only cursory attention,’ and ‘have had little difficulty upholding a wide range of funding conditions 
without a clearly explained relationship to the underlying legislation.’”).  
 14.   See infra Section III. 
 15.   Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537.  
 16.   See generally id.  
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immigration agencies.17  Originally, beginning in 1933, the agency that 
governed immigration law was the Immigration and Naturalization Service.18  
It was initially contained in the Department of Labor, but the agency was 
moved under the Department of Justice in 1940.19  The INS lasted until 2003 
when the government transformed the agency into “three different agencies 
under the Department of Homeland Security: The U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).” 20  
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks primarily motivated this shift.21  
These three branches of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have 
different roles.  USCIS is primarily in charge of “applications and petitions 
for immigration and naturalization benefits.”22  CBP and ICE are fairly 
similar.  CBP enforces immigration laws “at and between the ports of entry”, 
while ICE enforces immigration laws within the U.S. interior.23  ICE also 
controls both “detention and removal operations.”24  Under these different 
branches, there are many different pathways that individuals can take to gain 
legal status in the United States, depending on their specific factual 
background or the conditions of their home country.25 
The Trump administration has expanded the role of ICE.26  The Trump 
administration widened the agency directive to target “undocumented 
immigrants regardless of whether or not they had committed a serious 
crime.”27  This led to a forty-two percent increase in arrests during Trump’s 
first nine months in office.28  ICE, in its efforts to deport more undocumented 
individuals in this country, has pursued agreements with localities known as 
 
 17.   Id. at §§ 1101–1105a.  
 18.   USCIS and INS History, IMMIGR. RD., (last visited Oct. 3, 2020), 
https://immigrationroad.com/resource/uscis-ins-history.php [https://perma.cc/CBS6-D5KD].  
 19.   Id.  
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Sabrina Siddiqui, ‘We Protect Ice’: Trump Supporters Rally Behind Immigration Slogan, 
THE GUARDIAN, (July 8, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/08/ice-
immigration-customs-enforcement-trump-democrats [https://perma.cc/G7HK-4RT8]. 
 22.   Immigration Enforcement Actions, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/7QJD-28AD].  
 23.   Id.  
 24.   Id. 
 25.   The immigration system for individuals seeking lawful status is outside of the scope of this 
paper.  However, the following source provides a primer on immigration law in the United States.  See 
generally WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45020, A PRIMER ON U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICY (2018) (describing the dual sides of the immigration system, focusing on one side of the 
affirmative visa processes and the other side of the defensive processes against removal, among other 
facets of the process for individuals).  
 26.   Siddiqui, supra note 21. 
 27.   Id.   
 28.   Id.  
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§ 287(g) agreements.29  These agreements are based on Section 287(g) of the 
INA and “became law as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA).”30  These § 287(g) 
agreements delegate immigration authority to localities so that their police 
officers may act like ICE agents.31  As of this Comment’s writing, there are 
fifty-two jurisdictions that have “signed 287(g) agreements during the Trump 
administration.”32  The goal of the agreement is to focus on “collaboration” 
between ICE and localities, but the American Immigration Council notes that 
the program “has been costly for localities, has not focused on serious 
criminals, and has harmed the relationship between police and local 
communities.”33 
Due to the tensions surrounding the Trump administration’s immigration 
policy and § 287(g) agreements, some jurisdictions have pursued sanctuary 
laws as a response.  These sanctuary ordinances directly conflict with § 287(g) 
agreements.  The point of the agreement is to expand the Trump deportation 
regime, while sanctuary movements seek disentanglement from said regime.34  
The politics of the area seem to have an effect on whether the locality 
welcomes a § 287(g) agreement or pursues a sanctuary noncooperation policy.  
Yet, sanctuary cities require a more in-depth understanding due to their 
relevance in this conflict. 
B. Sanctuary Cities 
Sanctuary cities are at the heart of this conflict.  The origin of a sanctuary 
city is nothing new, in fact, it is an “ancient concept.”35  The purpose of a 
sanctuary city is to be a place of refuge for migrants in the face of a 
government seeking to displace them from the confines of its national 
borders.36  In many ways, these cities have begun to encompass the migrant’s 
 
 29.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); see also Laura Muñoz Lopez, How 287(g) Agreements Harm Public 
Safety, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 8, 2018, 9:01 AM),       
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2018/05/08/450439/287g-agreements-
harm-public-safety/ [https://perma.cc/FQT4-ZMY8]. 
 30.   The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 
 1 (July 2, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/287g-program-immigration 
[https://perma.cc/28LX-QDNF].  
 31.   See National Map of 287(g) Agreements, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. (Nov. 27, 2019), 
https://www.ilrc.org/national-map-287g-agreements [https://perma.cc/CYN4-ZER3].  
 32.   Id. 
 33.   The 287(g) Program: An Overview, supra note 30.  
 34.   See Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL  
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/sanctuary-policies-overview 
[https://perma.cc/8Z7L-FEZN]. 
 35.   Ananya Roy, The City in the Age of Trumpism: From Sanctuary to Abolition, 37 ENV’T & 
PLANNING D: SOC’Y & SPACE 761, Abstract (2019).  
 36.   Id. 
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“struggle in the United States, connoting resistance to white nationalism and 
the defiance of federal immigration policy.”37  However, sanctuary cities are 
not without their critics, from both sides of the political aisle.38  Despite this 
opposition, cities across the United States have attempted to make their 
localities safer for those not authorized to be in this country.39  Apart from the 
overarching philosophical goals of sanctuary cities, the practical goals and 
their history are also important to understanding their fight with the Trump 
administration because they highlight the tension on both sides of the 
immigration debate.  It is important to note that ‘sanctuary city’ is not a legal 
term.40  It is used broadly (and arguably vaguely) to refer to cities’ 
noncooperation policies with the federal government, encompassing all the 
various methods and degrees of noncooperation.41 
For over 20 years, the federal government has employed local police 
forces to help “find, arrest, and deport immigrants.”42  At the same time, 
progressive lawmakers have attempted to “reassert local autonomy” in an 
effort to detangle federal immigration enforcement from local law 
enforcement.43  These attempts have toed the line between affirmatively 
obstructing the federal government and simply deciding to abstain from 
helping it.44  When the localities cooperate, the federal government is much 
more effective at deporting migrants, explaining the frustration it has when 
localities are disobliging.45  The Trump administration has been primarily 
concerned with local jails failing to release migrants in their control to federal 
immigration enforcement.46  Legally speaking, localities “aren’t required to 
help the federal government”47 with immigration enforcement, meaning there 
 
 37.   Id. 
 38.   See id. (describing a liberal critique of sanctuary cities as statist violence); Seung Min Kim, 
Lawmakers Eye Crackdowns on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, POLITICO  
(July 21, 2015, 7:02 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/congress-sanctuary-cities-
immigration-fight-120438 [https://perma.cc/BM29-4JYL] (discussing conservative attempts to bar 
sanctuary cities).  
 39.   Allen, supra note 4.  
 40.   Dara Lind, Sanctuary Cities, Explained, VOX  
(Mar. 8, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/8/17091984/sanctuary-
cities-city-state-illegal-immigration-sessions [https://perma.cc/79FE-LK6V]. 
 41.   Id.  
 42.   Id.   
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Id.  
 45.   Id. (“Each year, from 2011 to 2014 — the peak of local-federal immigration cooperation — 
a single local-federal program, Secure Communities (which checked immigrants booked into local 
jails against federal databases), resulted in the deportation of more than 70,000 immigrants.  Secure 
Communities got more immigrants deported during those years than the entire federal government had 
in 1996.”).  
 46.   Id.  
 47.   Id. (emphasis in original).  
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is no “legal obligation.”48  At the same time, localities cannot prevent the 
federal government from obtaining information related to an individual’s 
immigration status according to the vague distinction in Section 1373 of 
Chapter 8 of the United States Code.49  This part of the United States Code 
prohibits localities from interfering with the DHS agencies obtaining 
immigration information about “any individual.”50  Localities, however, have 
argued that they are able to refrain from giving the federal government 
information regarding jail locations and release dates and still comply with 
the law, because such information is not directly related to immigration 
status.51 
Oregon exemplifies an ideal sanctuary community and has been used a 
model for other states.52  Oregon’s sanctuary law dates back more than thirty 
years,53 and mandates that “state and local law enforcement resources can’t 
be used to find or detain people whose only violation of the law is being in 
the country illegally.”54  Although some rebut characterizing Oregon’s model 
as a “sanctuary,”55 the resulting disagreements are the same—the federal 
government desires information about undocumented migrants that the states 
or localities refuse to provide.  Although Oregon’s law dates back to before 
the Trump administration,56 the situation that brought about this law mirrors 
the contemporary fight, including similar racially-motivated supporters of 
 
 48.   National Map of Local Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map [https://perma.cc/XC6F-A9RK].  
 49.   Lind, supra note 40; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373, invalidated by City of Chicago v. Barr, 405 
F. Supp. 3d 748, 762 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 50.   8 U.S.C. § 1373.  This section formerly applied to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, but the law transferred its “functions” to the new agency.  See USCIS and INS History, supra 
note 18.  
 51.   Lind, supra note 40; see also Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 230 F. Supp. 3d 994, 
1014–16 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  
 52.   Conrad Wilson, Oregon Was First Sanctuary Community to Respond to 
 ICE Subpoenas, E. OREGONIAN (Feb. 27, 2020),           
https://www.eastoregonian.com/news/state/oregon-was-first-sanctuary-community-to-respond-to-ice 
-subpoenas/article_6bb6beb2-5986-11ea-abc8-476ca58e0e6c.html [https://perma.cc/SQN9-DZ6Z]. 
 53.   Id.  
 54.   Sophie Murguia, Oregon Has the Nation’s Oldest Sanctuary Law.  It Might Not Survive This 
Election., MOTHER JONES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/10/oregon-
sanctuary-law-election/ [https://perma.cc/WR8P-G63E]; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.820 (West 
2020, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess.). 
 55.   Stephen W. Manning, A City & County Framework for an Immigrant-Inclusive Vision of 
Oregon as a Response to the Proposed, Constitutionally Risky Actions by President-Elect Trump, 
INNOVATION L. LAB 6 (Dec. 31, 2016), https://innovationlawlab.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/City-County-Oregon-Framework.vP2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP75-A8KN] 
(stating “Local Inclusive Resolutions should not be considered a ‘sanctuary’ . . . .”) (emphasis in 
original).  
 56.   Wilson, supra note 52. 
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anti-migrant initiatives.57  The law in Oregon has become a model for 
jurisdictions attempting to disrupt the Trump administration’s vow to deport 
millions of migrants.58  Recently, Los Angeles adopted the formal moniker 
“City of Sanctuary” in line with the Oregon model through a formal 
declaration.59  The measure reaffirmed the city’s commitment to “Special 
Order 40, which bars Los Angeles police officers from initiating contact with 
someone solely to determine whether they are in the country legally.”60  This 
was not the first time Los Angeles attempted to disentangle itself from federal 
immigration enforcement.  In 2015, L.A. ended its § 287(g) agreement with 
ICE.61  Oregon and Los Angeles highlight the differences between 
jurisdictions that use “sanctuary” to describe their very different 
noncooperation policies. 
A relevant question underlying the fight between Trump and sanctuary 
jurisdictions is the foundation and reasoning behind either supporting or 
denigrating the increase of deportations.  Trump and other conservative-
leaning immigration policymakers seek to deport more individuals because 
they believe, among other rationales, that undocumented migrants increase 
crime.62  These justifications for deportations are questioned by multiple 
studies analyzing the statistics regarding undocumented migrant crime.63  It is 
 
 57.   Compare Andrew Selksy, Oregon Voters Deciding Fate of Pioneering Sanctuary Law, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/4631703afd0642acae11ed0b8a12472c 
[https://perma.cc/KK5Y-HRFN] (describing the racial profiling of Delmiro Trevino, an American 
born in Texas, leading to Oregon becoming America’s first sanctuary state), with Jessica Taylor, 
Energized By Trump’s Win, White Nationalists Gather To ‘Change The World’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Nov. 20, 2016, 11:38 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/20/502719871/energized-by-trumps-win-
white-nationalists-gather-to-change-the-world [https://perma.cc/4FJT-ZYQ7] (describing the white 
nationalist movement and alt-right having a “psychic connection” with Trump, and their ultimate goal 
of “a return to the white origins of the country and protecting the white race.”).  
 58.   Wilson, supra note 52. 
 59.   Dakota Smith & Matthew Ormseth, It Took a While, but L.A. Formally Declares Itself a 
‘City of Sanctuary’, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-city-of-sanctuary-cedillo-20190208-story.html [https://perma.cc/5EJL-C8Q7].  
 60.   Id. 
 61.   Adela de la Torre, Breaking the ICE: NILC Calls for ICE-Free Los Angeles, NAT’L IMMIGR. 
L. CTR. (May 12, 2015), https://www.nilc.org/2015/05/12/l-a-county-287g-pep-immigration-
enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/MNR5-AQUB].  
 62.   Jason Zengerle, How America Got to ‘Zero Tolerance’ on Immigration: The Inside Story, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/magazine/immigration-
department-of-homeland-security.html [https://perma.cc/42ZP-S73Y].  
 63.   See RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION AND RATES OF CRIME AND 
IMPRISONMENT: POPULAR MYTHS AND EMPIRICAL REALITIES 2 (2008) (finding that perceptions about 
undocumented immigrants as criminals are “not supported empirically; instead, as demonstrated 
below, they are refuted by the preponderance of scientific evidence.”); John Hagan & Alberto Palloni, 
Sociological Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic Immigration and Crime, 46 SOC. PROBS. 
617, 617 (1999) (noting that “[o]ur sociological knowledge of crime is fragmented and ineffective in 
challenging and correcting mistaken public perceptions, for example, linking immigration and crime.  
These misperceptions are perpetuated by government reports of growing numbers of Hispanic 
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worth noting that being present in the United States in violation of 
immigration law is not a crime, it is a civil offense.64  This distinction is 
important because, absent an understanding of this difference, every 
undocumented migrant would be a criminal based on their lack of 
documentation.  According to the aforementioned statistics, those who oppose 
Trump’s actions allege that his deportation policies are rooted in xenophobia, 
and are unrelated to the goal of decreasing crime.65  Those on the other side, 
however, continue to allege that the U.S. is a better place when the 
government is vigilant about immigration status.66  These disagreements 
between the two sides of the political aisle have manifested in the Trump 
administration using a litany of strategies to attempt to constrain sanctuary 
jurisdictions.  Disputes, ranging from constitutional challenges, to funding 
conditions,67 to § 287(g) Agreements,68 and even political attacks,69 have 
followed Trump’s continued attempts to reign in sanctuary cities. 
C. The Trump Administration’s Immigration Cooperation Spending 
Conditions 
The Trump administration expanded its deportation regime, by promising 
to institute conditions on the receipt of federal grant dollars in an effort to 
 
immigrants in U.S. prisons.”); Elizabeth K. Stupi, Ted Chiricos & Marc Gertz, Perceived Criminal 
Threat from Undocumented Immigrants: Antecedents and Consequences for Policy Preferences, 33 
JUST. Q. 239, 239 (2014) (finding that “political ideology and education are the strongest predictors of 
perceived criminal threat.”).  
 64.   Merely being present and undocumented in the United States alone is not a crime.  If there 
are other circumstances surrounding the undocumented presence, such as a prior deportation order or 
other crimes committed, then the presence may become a misdemeanor or a felony.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1325–1326; Issue Brief: Criminalizing Undocumented Immigrants,  
ACLU 1 (Feb. 2010), https://www.aclu.org/other/issue-brief-criminalizing-undocumented-
immigrants [https://perma.cc/74HR-FHTU].  Moreover, Congress has expressly refused to pass the 
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which would have 
made mere undocumented presence a felony.  Id. at 2.  
 65.   Trump is Lying about Immigrant Crime – and the Research Proves It, S. POVERTY L. CTR. 
(May 17, 2019), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2019/05/17/trump-lying-about-immigrant-crime-
and-research-proves-it [https://perma.cc/55RG-4RVR] (concluding that “[r]esearch has long shown 
that recent immigrants are no more prone to criminality that native-born Americans.  In fact, studies 
have suggested they are less so.”).  
 66.   Craig Kafura & Bettina Hammer, Republicans and Democrats in 
Different Worlds on Immigration, CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOB. AFFS. 
 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/lcc/republicans-and-democrats-
different-worlds-immigration [https://perma.cc/C64M-CPM3].  
 67.   See cases cited supra note 7.  
 68.   National Map of 287(g) Agreements, supra note 31. 
 69.   Zack Budryk, Trump Revived Attacks on Sanctuary Cities to Distract from Mueller Report 
Release: Report, THE HILL (Apr. 14, 2019, 8:13 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/438862-trump-revived-attacks-on-sanctuary-cities-to-
distract-from-mueller [https://perma.cc/U4A4-7LXJ].  
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enforce compliance with federal immigration goals.70  The administration’s 
efforts “were smacked down hard by federal judges.”71  Specifically, the 
Trump administration attempted to invoke an executive order to “withhold 
funding from ‘sanctuary cities’ that limit cooperation with immigration 
authorities.”72  The Trump administration’s objective in these cases was to 
punish the jurisdictions limiting their cooperation with ICE.73  One of the 
appeals in the Ninth Circuit regarding the executive order found that the judge, 
in invalidating the conditions, had gone too far and could not enjoin Trump’s 
efforts nationwide.74  This led to a string of cases finding Trump’s efforts to 
punish these jurisdictions unenforceable.75 
One case in particular, City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General of the 
United States,76 illustrates how the majority of these cases were decided.  In 
City of Philadelphia, the city had received funding from the “federal Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (“Byrne JAG”) every year 
since the program’s inception in 2006.”77  Despite this long history, the Justice 
Department changed the conditions used to determine fund allocation for 
Fiscal Year 2017.78  The Department altered the conditions to include “greater 
coordination with federal officials on matters of immigration enforcement.”79  
The new conditions included a Certification Condition (requiring the 
applicant to certify their compliance with sharing immigration status 
information) and a Notice Condition (requiring the applicant to notify DHS 
of an undocumented migrant’s release date from their custody).80  Based on 
failure to satisfy these new conditions, the Attorney General withheld the 
funds from Philadelphia, and the city sued to enjoin this decision.81  The 
fundamental issue was whether Congress “empowered the Attorney General 
to promulgate the Challenged Conditions.”82  The Third Circuit found that 
 
 70.   Anita Kumar, Trump Administration Funds Sanctuary Cities Despite Pledge, Angering 
Supporters, MCCLATCHY DC (May 29, 2018, 5:00  
AM), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/white-house/article211897764.html 
[https://perma.cc/4GAF-YT7S].  
 71.   Lind, supra note 40; see also cases cited supra note 7. 
 72.   Associated Press, Trump Order to Withhold Funding from ‘Sanctuary Cities’ is Illegal, 
Court Says, PBS NEWS HOUR (Aug. 1, 2018, 2:37 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-order-to-withhold-funding-from-sanctuary-cities-is-
illegal-court-says [https://perma.cc/XQ3G-3HHB].  
 73.   Id. 
 74.   Id.; City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 75.   See cases cited supra note 7.  
 76.   916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019).  
 77.   Id. at 279. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Id. at 280. 
 81.   Id. at 279. 
 82.   Id. at 284. 
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Congress had not conferred the Attorney General with said power.83  In effect, 
the court stopped the administration from using the conditions related to 
immigration cooperation to deny funding to Philadelphia.  This case did not 
reach an analysis under the Spending Clause.84 
D. The Spending Clause 
Nestled in the Trump administration’s attempts to condition funding in 
order to punish sanctuary jurisdictions are Spending Clause issues.  This 
clause sets limits for what the federal government can do in terms of 
spending.85  Courts have long held that the government is able to set 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds under the Clause.86  Yet, the power 
to condition funding is subject to restrictions—the spending program must be 
in pursuit of the general welfare, the condition must be unambiguous, and the 
condition cannot be unrelated “to the federal interest in particular national 
projects or programs.”87  The last requirement, relatedness, is the subject of 
this paper’s analysis. 
The relatedness requirement (or, in other words, the “not-unrelated” 
requirement) comes primarily from two landmark cases—Massachusetts v. 
United States88 and Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken.89  Both of these 
cases were cited in what would become another landmark case, South Dakota 
v. Dole.90  Massachusetts v. United States was a case about a federal 
registration tax on aircraft.91  The State of Massachusetts owned a helicopter 
for police duties and refused to pay the tax.92  In response, the federal 
government levied the debt on one of the State’s accounts, and Massachusetts 
filed suit to recover a refund.93  The primary issues the Court addressed 
involved the implied immunity of state governments and the Spending 
 
 83.   Id. at 291.  
 84.   Id. at 284 (finding “if the Attorney General did not have that authority, then [the court] 
needn’t reach the other claims.”). 
 85.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 86.   See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) (“Incident to [the Spending 
Power], Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed 
the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 
compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.’”) (quoting Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). 
 87.   Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)).  
 88.   435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 89.   357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958).   
 90.   483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).  
 91.  Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 446. 
 92.   Id. at 452. 
 93.   Id. 
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Clause.94  Massachusetts argued the tax was invalid because the funding 
conditions were not directly related to their use.95  The Court noted case law 
consistently reinforced the notion that “the Federal Government may impose 
appropriate conditions on the use of federal property or privileges . . . with 
conditions that are reasonably related to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.”96  Under this analysis, the Court found that 
taxing the State was a permissible function of making the states pay a portion 
of the “costs of the benefits they enjoy from federal programs.”97 
Massachusetts v. United States cites Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. 
McCracken98 as a case supporting appropriate conditions on federal funding.99  
Ivanhoe discussed the Supreme Court of California’s refusal to confirm two 
reclamation contracts citing the Reclamation Act of 1902.100  The 
Reclamation Act also included a repayment provision to the federal 
government for “funds expended on the construction of reclamation” 
projects.101  The Supreme Court of California held this part of the Act was 
invalid.102  In part, the challenge asserted that the federal government’s 
general authority to “establish and execute” these projects was invalid, 
including the spending conditions attached to the projects.103  The Ivanhoe 
Court reversed the California Supreme Court on all issues, and, in pertinent 
part for this paper, noted that “the Federal Government may establish and 
impose reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the project.”104 
The Court reiterated the arguments in these two cases when it articulated 
the current framework for conditional spending analysis in South Dakota v. 
Dole.105  Dole was a case about transportation funding.106  Congress passed a 
law ordering the Secretary of Transportation “to withhold a percentage” of a 
State’s transportation funding if the State’s minimum drinking age was less 
than 21.107  South Dakota challenged the law, in part, under the Spending 
 
 94.   Id. at 454–63.  
 95.   Id. at 454.  
 96.   Id. at 461 (citing Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294–96 (1958); 
Oklahoma v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 142–44 (1947); United States v. San 
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29–30 (1940); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976); Fry 
v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975)). 
 97.   Id. 
 98.   357 U.S. 275 (1958). 
 99.   Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461. 
 100.   Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 357 U.S. at 277; 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1902). 
 101.   Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist., 357 U.S. at 278. 
 102.   Id. at 277–78. 
 103.   Id. at 294–99. 
 104.   Id. at 295. 
 105.   483 U.S. 203, 207–09 (1987). 
 106.   Id. at 205. 
 107.   Id. 
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Clause.108  The Court upheld the transportation spending condition, in part, 
writing that conditions on federal grants “might be illegitimate if they are 
unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or 
programs.’”109  The Court did not analyze the relatedness of the condition to 
the use of the funds because South Dakota never contended the conditions 
were unrelated to transportation.110 
However, Justice O’Connor, in her dissent, fully analyzed the relatedness 
question.111  O’Connor differed from prior case law in how she articulated the 
relatedness requirement.  She wrote that the condition “must be reasonably 
related to the purpose of the expenditure”112 whereas the majority wrote that 
the condition might be “illegitimate if they are unrelated” to the federal 
goals.113  This difference, although semantic, led Justice O’Connor to find that 
the spending condition was invalid because it was not reasonably related to 
the purpose of the funding.114  She cited the same two cases as the majority 
did—Massachusetts and Ivanhoe Irrigation—but found that the 
transportation spending law was both over- and under-inclusive.115  Another 
way to articulate the difference between the majority’s holding and 
O’Connor’s dissent is a comparison with the different levels of scrutiny the 
Court has applied to other areas of constitutional law.  Generally, when the 
constitutionality of a law is challenged before the Supreme Court under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the First Amendment, 
the Court scrutinizes the law using three different levels of scrutiny: rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.116  Under rational basis, or 
“minimum rationality” view, the law asks whether the condition is rationally 
related to legitimate government interests.117  Under the intermediate scrutiny 
level, “the legislation must be substantially related to advancing important or 
substantial governmental interests . . . .”118  Finally, under the strictest test, 
strict scrutiny, the law must directly advance a compelling government 
 
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 110.   Id. at 208. 
 111.   Id. at 212–18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 112.   Id. at 213 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 113.   Id. at 207 (majority opinion) (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 
(1978) (plurality opinion)). 
 114.   Id. at 218 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 115.   Id.  
 116.   R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related 
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern 
Supreme Court Practice, 4. U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 227–28 (2002).  
 117.   Id. at 228.   
 118.   Id.   
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interest.119  Although the Supreme Court generally does not reference the 
levels of scrutiny directly, it seems the majority in Dole only employs a 
rational basis test for whether the condition is related to the goals of the 
grant.120  On the other hand, O’Connor uses a test more similar to intermediate 
scrutiny when focusing more on the condition’s substantial relation to the 
purposes of the funding.121  The levels of scrutiny are helpful in identifying 
the difference in approach between the majority’s opinion and Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent and are also helpful in identifying a more rigorous 
analysis for the relatedness requirement. 
These conditional Spending Clause issues have filtered through to the 
instant case subject to this paper’s analysis—focusing on Trump’s promise to 
defund all sanctuary jurisdictions. 
E. The Los Angeles Case 
Trump was not able to make good on his promise to defund all sanctuary 
jurisdictions, even outside of the court context.122  Overall, Trump attempted 
to follow through on his promise by focusing on two grant programs—the 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program and the 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program.123  Republicans 
focused on introducing “legislation that sought to strip jurisdictions violating 
Section 1373 of funding under two federal programs – the . . . (JAG) 
program . . . and the . . . (COPS) program.”124  The latter program is at the 
center of the Los Angeles case.125 
The federal government established the COPS grant program under the 
Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 1994.126  
Originally, the COPS grant was intended to increase the amount of law 
enforcement officers in communities to improve communication and 
cooperation between the communities and officers, in what the Act calls 
 
 119.   Id.   
 120.   While the majority does not directly reference a level of scrutiny, by upholding this 
restriction, it recognizes drinking age is not unrelated to transportation safety, suggesting a rational 
basis standard of review.  Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.  
 121.   Id. at 213–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that setting a minimum drinking age is “not 
sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for 
that purpose.”).  
 122.   See Kumar supra note 70.  
 123.   See Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of Connecticut, Attorney General Tong 
Joins Coalition of 15 AGs in Brief to Protect Critical Law Enforcement Funding from Trump 
Administration’s Unconstitutional Overreach (May 30, 2019).  
 124.   Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary 
City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539, 552 (2017).  
 125.   City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 126.   Id. at 1183 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). 
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“community partnerships.”127  The Act also created the COPS Office, under 
the DOJ, to administer the COPS program.128 
In the vein of pursuing the goal of increasing police-community 
relationships, the federal grant dollars were allocated to “hire community 
policing professionals, develop and test innovative policing strategies, and 
provide training and technical assistance to community members, local 
government leaders, and all levels of law enforcement.”129  The dollars can be 
put toward a litany of purposes; including, “hiring or re-hiring community 
policing officers; procuring law enforcement equipment, technology, or 
support systems; or establishing school-based partnerships between local law 
enforcement agencies and local school systems.”130  Over the lifetime of the 
grant, the funding has vacillated between these purposes, but all the initiatives 
have purported to focus on improving community relationships.131 
Then-Attorney General Sessions subsequently converted the purpose of 
the COPS grant program to “divert federal funds . . . to press state and local 
police into federal immigration enforcement” in an effort to employ this 
program as another tool for the Trump administration.132  The majority in the 
City of Los Angeles case found the purpose of the COPS program to be 
broader,  and characterized the grant’s goals as combatting crime and disorder 
problems, rather than solely focused on community-oriented policing.133 
In order to receive funding under the grant, each city must submit an 
application to the DOJ for review.134  In the application, there is a series of 
questions in which the applicant city can prove why it qualifies to receive the 
grant dollars.135  The application, among other requirements, asks each 
applicant to identify its strategies for remedying crime and disorder problems, 
as well as asking each applicant to identify a problem or focus area.136  There 
are eight focus areas to choose from, one of which is a focus on “illegal 
immigrations.”137  The guidelines for the “illegal immigration” focus area 
state many familiar ways the Trump administration has preferred to engage 
 
 127.   Id.  
 128.   NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10922, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING 
SERVICES (COPS) PROGRAM 1 (2019).  
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. 
 132.   City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1183 (9th Cir. 2019) (Wardlaw, J. dissenting). 
 133.   Id. at 1169 (majority opinion). 
 134.   Id. 
 135.   Id. at 1170. 
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Id. at 1170–71.  The eight focus areas are illegal immigrations, child and youth safety, drug 
abuse education, prevention and intervention, homeland security problems, nonviolent crime problems 
and quality of life policing, building trust and respect, traffic/pedestrian safety problems, and violent 
crimes problems.  Id.  
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with localities on immigration, including a “focus on partnering with the 
federal law enforcement to address illegal immigration for information 
sharing, [§] 287(g) partnerships, task forces and honoring detainers.”138  After 
“evaluat[ing], scor[ing], and rank[ing]” the applications, the DOJ grants funds 
to cities with the highest scores.139  Among other criteria, such as the need for 
federal dollars and the application’s commitment to increasing community-
oriented policing, the DOJ “scores applicants on how their proposals relate to 
that year’s federal goals.”140  The City of Los Angeles challenged the fact that 
in 2017 the DOJ “gave additional points to applicants that focused on . . . 
violent crime, homeland security, and control of illegal immigration.”141 
Due to limited funding, not every city that applied could receive grant 
dollars.142  One-third of the large jurisdictions and roughly fourteen percent 
of small jurisdictions received grant funding.143  The DOJ awarded bonus 
points to jurisdictions that committed to cooperating with the federal 
government on combatting illegal immigration.144  Seven of the applicants 
reported illegal immigration as their focus area, and two received grants.145  
In both large and small jurisdictions, over sixty percent of applications that 
received funding submitted a “Certification of Illegal Immigration 
Cooperation.”146  The DOJ announced this “bonus certification” two months 
after the 2017 applications were due.147  Upon announcing the 2017 funding 
awards, then-Attorney General Sessions stated that “eighty percent of the 
grantees have agreed to cooperate with federal immigration authorities in their 
detention facilities” and he “applaud[ed grantees’] commitment to the rule of 
law and to ending violent crime, including violent crime stemming from 
illegal immigration.”148  The plaintiff in City of Los Angeles v. Barr chose 
“building trust and respect” as its focus area and did not select “illegal 
immigration” or sign the Cooperation Certification.149  When Los Angeles 
was not awarded grant dollars, it filed “a complaint seeking to enjoin [the] 
 
 138.    Id. at 1171 (footnotes omitted). 
 139.   Id. 
 140.   Id. 
 141.   Id. 
 142.   Id. at 1172 (noting Congress allocated around “$98.5 million for grants,” and “applicants 
requested almost $410 million.”). 
 143.   Id.  Note the statute governing this grant program differentiates between “large” and “small” 
jurisdictions.  See 34 U.S.C. § 10382.  Small jurisdictions are those with a population of less than 
50,000.  Id. at § 10382(d)(1).   
 144.   City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1190 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). 
 145.   Id. at 1172 (majority opinion).  
 146.   Id. at 1171–72 (noting that 19 of the 30 large jurisdictions and 124 of the 149 small 
jurisdictions that received funding reported a Certification).  
 147.   Id. at 1190 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).  
 148.   Id. at 1191 (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).  
 149.   Id. at 1172 (majority opinion). 
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DOJ’s practice of awarding points to applicants that selected the illegal 
immigration focus area and to applicants that completed a Certification related 
to illegal immigration.”150 
The district court held that the bonus points and application procedures 
executed by Sessions and the DOJ were not lawful conditions.151  On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit discussed three different issues: (1) a separation of powers 
challenge, (2) a Spending Clause challenge, and (3) an Administrative 
Procedure Act challenge.152 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the bonus points awarded through both 
a focus area on immigration and the Certification were not violative of the 
Spending Clause.153  It noted that the federal government has the ability to 
condition the states’ receipt of federal funds in order to persuade the states to 
take actions Congress could not require them to take otherwise.154  Yet, this 
power to condition is not unlimited, but is subject to four limitations: (1) the 
condition must support the general welfare, (2) it must be unambiguous, (3) it 
cannot force states to take unconstitutional actions, and (4) it “may not impose 
conditions on federal grants that are unrelated to the federal interest in 
particular national projects or programs.”155  This final prong, the relatedness 
prong, is the subject of this Comment’s analysis. 
On said prong, the City of Los Angeles majority stated that the standard 
for relatedness is not demanding, and the prior case law has been cursory, 
noting that “the Court has never struck down a condition on federal grants 
based on this relatedness prong.”156  In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit was 
quick to dismiss the relatedness analysis, indicating that the condition “meets 
the low bar of being germane to the federal interest in providing the funding 
to ‘address crime and disorder problems, and otherwise . . . enhance public 
safety.’”157  The majority and the dissent applied this relatedness analysis 
primarily under the separation of powers challenge to the procedure.158  The 
majority found the goals of the Act to be “broad” and noted that the bonus 
 
 150.   Id.  
 151.   Id. at 1169.  The majority also discussed whether the application procedures were truly 
harming Los Angeles and whether they are a condition.  Id. at 1173–76.  These issues are outside of 
the scope of this paper, and this paper assumes, as the majority held, that they are a condition to be 
relevantly analyzed by the Spending Clause.  
 152.   Id. at 1172.  Outside of the Spending Clause, the other two issues are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 153.   Id. at 1176. 
 154.   Id. at 1174 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 576 (2012). 
 155.   City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1174–75 (internal quotations omitted) (citing South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987)); see also NOLAN, ET AL., supra note 13, at 28–35. 
 156.   City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1175. 
 157.   Id. at 1176 (alteration in original).  
 158.   Id. at 1177–81.  Id. at 1191–93 (Wardlow, J., dissenting). 
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points were “entirely consistent” with said broad goals.159  On the other hand, 
the dissent explored the history of community-policing in depth, defining the 
goals more narrowly, by looking at the context of the COPS program itself.160  
The dissent found the bonus points inconsistent with this narrower 
construction of the Act’s goals.161  Neither opinion reached the relatedness 
prong with any prolific discussion.  As the dissent stated, “[w]hichever of the 
three violations we consider, however, the fundamental point is the same: 
Congress did not authorize the Attorney General to act with unfettered 
discretion in imposing conditions for COPS grants unrelated to community-
oriented policing.”162 
III. RELATEDNESS ANALYSIS 
As the majority in the City of Los Angeles case noted, the relatedness 
prong of the Spending Clause of the Constitution has only been cursorily 
discussed in the previous case law.163  Yet, this fact is inconsistent with the 
purpose behind the relatedness prong.  The fact that the Trump administration 
is using federal grant programs to pursue unrelated policy goals presents a 
unique opportunity to analyze the relatedness prong with more force.  This 
Comment’s analysis focuses on two essential points.  The first is that the 
Supreme Court’s limited precedential analysis of the relatedness prong must 
be set aside, so that today’s courts can give it more force.  The second is that 
the Trump administration’s change in the application process for the COPS 
grant program likely would not pass a newly invigorated relatedness test. 
A. Reinvigorating the Relatedness Prong 
The relatedness prong of the Spending Clause should be reinvigorated.  
In the context of a challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Justice Marshall 
declared, in his scathing Salerno dissent: 
 
Our Constitution . . . can shelter us forever from the evils 
of . . . unchecked power.  Over 200 years it has slowly, 
through our efforts, grown more durable, more expansive, 
and more just.  But it cannot protect us if we lack the 
 
 159.   Id. at 1178 (majority opinion). 
 160.   Id. at 1184–91 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).  
 161.   Id. at 1191.  
 162.   Id. at 1195 n.47 (emphasis added).  
 163.   Id. at 1175 (majority opinion) (noting the Supreme Court has never struck down a condition 
on federal funding for being unrelated).  
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courage, and the self-restraint, to protect ourselves.164 
 
Although this quote arose in a criminal law context, Justice Marshall’s 
powerful words propel a basis for employing the relatedness clause with more 
than perfunctory force.  The Constitution was, indeed, set up to restrain 
unchecked government power.  Trump’s actions have set the stage for the 
Constitution to serve this purpose.165  In order to understand the importance 
of the relatedness prong against this constitutional backdrop, historical 
context is key. 
The Dole test, historically, may have been intended to be more rigid than 
how it has been applied in recent years.166  The current jurisprudence has made 
it almost impossible to invalidate any condition challenged,167 yet the 
traditional debate behind this prong was far more contentious than 
contemporary hasty analyses.  The origins of the traditional views on how to 
apply the relatedness prong, can be traced to Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison.168  Although Madison and Hamilton’s debate was more focused on 
the Spending Clause in general, their arguments directly relate to relatedness 
prong issues.  Madison did not think the Spending Clause should be read as a 
“separate grant of power” but supported a “narrow” construction, implying 
the importance of the four qualifications under the Clause.169  Hamilton, on 
the other hand, favored a strong federal government and recognized the Clause 
as a “separate and distinct” grant of power, implying opposition to a more 
demanding spending test.170  These positions were argued  before the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Butler, where the Court appeared to adopt the 
Hamiltonian view, allowing an expanded version of the Spending Clause.171  
It is important to note that their debate was far broader than this paper’s 
specific focus on one prong of the Spending Clause test—it was about 
Congress’ exercise of the spending power in general.  Despite this, the debate 
and Butler still highlight a salient fact—the discussion of the Spending Clause 
 
 164.   United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court has never struck down a condition based on unrelatedness). 
 168.   Venhuizen, supra note 166 at 582. 
 169.   Id. 
 170.   Id.  
 171.   297 U.S. 1, 86–88 (1936). 
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has not always been so cursory. 
Although the Court in recent history has held otherwise, a more rigid 
construction of this test is consistent with the rationale behind the relatedness 
prong from its inception and is backed by historical and legal support.  The 
relatedness prong has an important history in the Constitution.  It is meant to 
restrict overbroad government power, and maintain the balance of power in 
the federal system.172  As the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) wrote in its amicus brief in Dole “[u]nrelated spending conditions 
can destroy state autonomy by permitting Congress to legislate outside the 
limits of its delegated regulatory powers.  Such conditions constitute a 
fundamental subversion of our constitutional system, which bestowed limited 
powers on the federal government and reserved all other regulation of private 
activity to the States.”173  This analysis is magnified when juxtaposed with the 
“dramatic rise” in federal programs and agencies since Dole.174  While the 
NCSL brief warns of Congress’ addition of unrelated spending conditions, 
they did not anticipate the possibility of the President independently 
conditioning funds through agency powers under his control.  Given the 
massive scope of federal programs, if the President is able to command 
agencies and programs to condition their funds on unrelated presidential 
objectives, the President is effectively able to bypass the role of working with 
Congress. Therefore, the President is able to implement policies balanced 
against state protections—abrogating the careful constitutional system in 
place. 
Relatedness ensures that the President and her administration are unable 
to dominate states’ abilities to receive funding, conditioned commensurate 
with their own goals that Congress did not contemplate.  If unenforced, the 
President is able to cherry-pick any congressionally-approved spending grants 
and enforce completely unconnected policy objectives as a condition to 
receiving said funds, depending on the ability of the President or agencies to 
impose conditions not specified by statute.  The coercive nature of these 
actions matches some of the concerns discussed in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius.175  In this case, when discussing the 
Spending Clause implications of the Affordable Care Act, the States 
contended that the Medicaid expansion exceeded congressional authority and 
was coercive.176  In reviewing this issue, the Court noted that the Spending 
 
 172.   Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 1, South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (No. 86-260).  
 173.   Id. (emphasis added).  
 174.   Id. (quoting WORKING GRP. ON FEDERALISM, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA, at 
30 (1986)).  
 175.   567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
 176.   Id. at 540. 
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Clause is like a “contract,” where the State “voluntarily and knowingly 
accepts the terms.”177  By forcing the States to adopt changes to their Medicaid 
programs under a threat of withholding funding, the States alleged that this 
was coercive and did not comport with the idea of the contract.178  In simpler 
terms, this is not what the states signed up for. 
A similar line of reasoning belies the argument for reinforcing the 
relatedness standard.  Relatedness is key to avoiding a bait-and-switch-style 
federal government that uses states’ and localities’ reliance on programs to 
coax them into pursuing federal goals unrelated to said programs.  Arguably, 
these fears are currently being played out by the Trump administration in the 
immigration context.179  It is possible that the “relatedness prong could be 
narrowed to require that conditions be germane to the purpose of the 
funding.”180  Notably, the amount of funding in the City of Los Angeles case 
is not enough to be considered coercive, but the same logic behind the two 
situations applies. 
In subsequent landmark cases, the language the Court used could also 
provide a basis for strengthening the relatedness prong.181  For example, in 
Dole, the Court cited to Massachusetts v. United States to find that relatedness 
was a limitation on the federal government’s power to condition funding.182  
In Massachusetts v. United States, the Court noted the requirement at issue in 
the case was “reasonably related” because it was “closely related to the federal 
interest in recovering costs from those who benefit.”183  The Ivanhoe case, 
cited by the Court in both Dole and Massachusetts v. United States, found that 
“the Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions 
relevant to [the] federal interest in the project . . . .”184  The very language of 
the precedential cases’ analyses—“closely related”185 and “relevant”186—
demands a higher standard than the “low bar” used in the more contemporary 
 
 177.   Id. at 577 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 178.   Id. at 579.  
 179.   See Lenny T. Mendonca & Laura D. Tyson, The New Era of  
Progressive Federalism, NEW AM., 8, (Feb. 23,  
2018) https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Progressive_Federalism_FINAL_2-22.pdf 
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 180.   Venhuizen, supra note 166, at 593. 
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U.S. 548 (1937), Oklahoma v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), and 
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 182.   South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (citing Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461–62).  
 183.   Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461–62  (emphasis added). 
 184.   Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (emphasis added).  
 185.   Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 461–62. 
 186.   Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. at 295. 
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cases, including City of Los Angeles.187 
The way the Dole majority wrote the relatedness requirement, when 
juxtaposed against the language in the cases the Court relied on to articulate 
it, seems to fundamentally alter the test.  It removes any language such as 
“closely”, “relevant”, or “reasonably related” and replaces it with a question 
phrased in the negative—is it unrelated?188  This phrasing takes the onus off 
of the stringency that prior case law seems to place on the requirement, 
arguably reducing the standard to a mere rational basis review. 
The “low bar” reasonableness approach does not comport with the 
reasons underlying the reasonableness prong, and Justice O’Connor’s dissent 
in Dole relied on the notion that relatedness should be a stronger obstacle, 
more similar to intermediate scrutiny.189  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor 
wrote: 
 
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress’ 
notion of the general welfare, . . . the Spending Clause gives 
power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade 
the states’ jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the 
whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-
imposed.  This, of course, as Butler held, was not the 
Framers’ plan and it is not the meaning of the Spending 
Clause.190 
 
Her dissent provides analytical support for the idea that conditions must 
be subject to a more rigorous relatedness analysis, otherwise the federal 
government can invade spaces where it ought not.191  Primarily, Justice 
O’Connor wrote that the condition must be “reasonably related” to the goals 
of the act, arguing that a minimum drinking age was far too “attenuated” to 
be related to highway funding.192  She analyzed that even the “possible 
connection” of highway safety did not have anything to do with “the 
expenditure of funds for highway construction”—functionally elevating the 
scrutiny of relatedness towards intermediate or even strict scrutiny.193  As a 
part of her analysis of whether the condition was “reasonably related”, her 
dissent used an over- and under-inclusive test.194  She wrote that if the goal of 
 
 187.   City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 188.   South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 189.   Id. at 212–18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 190.   Id. at 217 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 191.   Id. at 217–18. 
 192.   Id. at 215–18.  
 193.   Id. at 218.  
 194.   Id. at 214–15.  
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the challenged minimum drinking age is to stop drunk people from driving “it 
is far too over and under-inclusive.  It is over-inclusive because it stops 
teenagers from drinking even when they are not about to drive on interstate 
highways.  It is under-inclusive because teenagers pose only a small part of 
the drunken driving problem in this Nation.”195 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent is reinforced when reviewing some of the 
cases where courts have upheld spending conditions “without a clearly 
explained relationship to the underlying legislation.”196  For example, in order 
for states to receive federal funds under the Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families Program, they must maintain an automated child support 
enforcement system.197  Further, in order to receive Medicaid funds, Congress 
imposed a condition that states must provide emergency medical services to 
undocumented migrants.198  Additionally, in order to receive federal funds for 
prisons and state institutions, the state must comply with a heightened 
standard to protect religious freedom for prisoners.199  Regardless of the 
commendable goals the previous conditions contain, it is hard to argue that 
they are related to the underlying programs.200  This emphasizes the fact that 
the relatedness prong is currently a very low bar to overcome, and rarely is 
analyzed with any vigor.201 
Moreover, although states desire to enforce commendable conditions, the 
true justification and debate for strengthening the relatedness prong arises 
when the conditions are not as commendable.  The Framers wrote the clause 
with the fear of a tyrannical government looming over them, and thus it should 
be strengthened with that fear in mind.  This notion is also playing out in other 
related contexts, where more liberal-leaning lawmakers are now discussing 
federalism’s importance in the face of Trump’s policies creating “[h]ostility 
toward immigrants” and even, in some cases, violence.202  On the whole, these 
ideas highlight the importance of reinforcing the relatedness clause, which is 
the first step in arguing that the City of Los Angeles case could not pass a 
reinforced relatedness test. 
Importantly, not all contemporary cases have upheld unrelated spending 
 
 195.   Id.  
 196.   Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon 
Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L. J. 459, 
466 (2003). 
 197.   Id.  
 198.   Id.  
 199.   Id. at 466–67.  
 200.   Id. at 466 (“In most instances . . . the court has done little more than assert, without analysis 
or elaboration, that the challenged condition is ‘reasonably related to the federal interest in the national 
program.’”). 
 201.   Id. at 466–69. 
 202.   See generally Mendonca & Tyson, supra note 179, at 1.  
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conditions.  Despite the fact that “the [Supreme] Court has never struck down 
a condition on federal grants based on this relatedness prong,”203 lower courts 
have reviewed the prong with more force.  For instance, in Guillen v. Pierce 
County, the parties argued about whether the federal interest in safety 
enhancement equipment could be a bar on discovery of state accident 
reports.204  In this case, the Supreme Court of Washington found “no valid 
federal interest in the operation of the federal safety enhancement program is 
reasonably served by barring the admissibility and discovery in state court of 
accident reports.”205  Although this case was later reversed on other grounds 
by the Supreme Court of the United States,206 the language serves as a 
potential beacon of reinvigoration. 
Another example involves the City of Philadelphia and the JAG Program, 
where the City argued that a program focusing on local criminal enforcement 
could not be related to goals of civil federal immigration enforcement.207  
Although the Attorney General sought to argue that the criminal law and 
immigration law intertwined, the federal district court found that “the 
argument that enforcement of federal immigration laws is related to [the 
program’s criminal] objective is unsustainable . . . . The federal interest in 
enforcing immigration laws falls outside of the scope of the Byrne JAG 
program.”208  In all, these cases provide brief examples of the relatedness 
prong being applied more stringently.  Thus, tightening the relatedness prong 
remains possible, yet unlikely. 
The relatedness prong of the Spending Clause in the Constitution should 
be reinforced in light of its history buttressed against its cursory treatment in 
the past.  Because the federal government has expanded its power while 
simultaneously starting to place unrelated conditions on grants of federal 
dollars to make states pursue its policy goals, the time for the courts to 
reinvigorate and elevate the scrutiny applied to the relatedness prong is now.  
Coupling the interest of the states in balancing their power with the federal 
government and the prong’s purpose of restraining federal power, along with 
the few cases and dissents that have begun to outline the previously-avoided 
relatedness test, the prong should be strengthened to better serve the Spending 
Clause’s original purpose. 
 
 203.   City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 204.   Guillen v. Pierce Cnty., 31 P.3d 628, 632–33 (Wash. 2001) (en banc), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 537 U.S. 129 (2003).  
 205.   Id. at 651 (emphasis added). 
 206.   See Pierce Cnty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147–48 (2003).   
 207.   City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591 (2017).  
 208.   Id. at 642. 
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B. Applying the Test 
If the relatedness prong were tightened, actions like the COPS program’s 
bonus point system for immigration-complying jurisdictions would likely be 
invalidated.  In contrast to the majority in Dole, 
 
Justice O’Connor . . . would have required a much closer fit 
between the funding condition and the proclaimed federal 
interest.  Thus, she, unlike the Dole majority,  would not 
sustain a funding condition found to be over- or under-
inclusive.  She therefore would have invalidated the funding 
condition on the ground that it was not sufficiently related to 
interstate highway construction.209 
 
In parsing out the relatedness test, there are a few ways to show whether 
the condition is related to the goals of the federal program.  The main issue is 
whether the condition sufficiently relates to the federal interest of the project 
on its merits.  One way to test this is by using Justice O’Connor’s over- and 
under-inclusiveness analysis.210  Yet, not all cases employing a relatedness 
analysis have used O’Connor’s over- or under-inclusiveness analysis,211 
suggesting there is more than one possible way to show that the condition is 
related.  Another way is to compare the goals of the program with the 
condition as defined by the majority, under a question of whether they 
reasonably relate.  Functionally, the comparison test uses a broader goal 
definition to still reveal the lack of relatedness.  Finally, borrowing from other 
types of jurisprudence, such as takings clause litigation, congruence and 
proportionality can produce another possible test to elevate the relatedness 
analysis.  When applied to the COPS grant program’s bonus points, the 
condition on the receipt of federal funds likely would not pass any of the tests. 
 
 209.   Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 210.   Id.; see supra note 195 and accompanying text.  
 211.   See generally Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 460–62 (1978) (plurality 
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grounds, 537 U.S. 129 (2003) (finding the condition unrelated because the federal funding had “strings 
attached” that interfered with the “basic functioning of state government”); City of Philadelphia, 280 
F. Supp. 3d at 642 (finding the condition unrelated after looking to the statutory purpose).  
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1. Inclusiveness Analysis 
The easiest way to perform the analysis is to review the majority’s holding 
in City of Los Angeles and then inspect the reasons to rebut it.  The majority 
found that the bonus points awarded for certain jurisdictions were valid 
because immigration cooperation was related to the goals of reducing crime 
and disorder, as well as increasing public safety.212  The way the majority 
defined the goals of the program were far broader than the dissent, and were 
also manifestly ahistorical and incorrect.213  Notably, the very starting point 
for the majority’s analysis began with the wrong goals in mind.  Even if the 
relatedness clause is a low bar to pass, that does not mean the analysis defining 
the goals of the federal interest must be cursory as well.  As the dissent pointed 
out, the goals of the program are best viewed through a lens of how the 
program’s dollars have actually been used.214  Here, the COPS program’s 
funds have been dispersed to aid community policing functions, and at times 
to invest into officer training.215  Specifically, Congress enacted the Act 
establishing the COPS grant program in order to “strengthen the relationship 
between the police and the people they serve, fostering trust and increasing 
accountability.”216 
The problem within the majority’s analysis is that it takes a benefit of the 
program and turns it into the program’s goal in order to fashion a more 
sweeping umbrella under which immigration cooperation can fall—but this is 
improper.  An increased level of scrutiny makes the impropriety even clearer.  
Decreasing crime and disorder problems may be a tangential benefit and result 
of improving police and community relationships, but it is not the real goal 
the COPS program seeks to address. 
A review of the previous case law makes this point even more fatal to the 
majority’s holding.  For instance, in Dole, the Court noted that “safe interstate 
travel” was a main purpose of the reason highway funds were expended.217  
Moreover, even lower courts find an examination of the “rationale” behind 
the implementation of a program is key—specifically the backdrop and 
circumstances that produced the legislation affect relatedness.218 
 
 212.   City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1163, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 213.   Id. at 1192 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (“The federal immigration preferences flout the clear 
congressional purpose of COPS grants—to promote partnership between local law enforcement and 
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 216.   Id. at 1186 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-324, at 7 (1993)).  
 217.   See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987). 
 218.   Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 874 (D.S.C. 2000) (analyzing the legislative 
purpose behind child support enforcement funds and TANF funds). 
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Without reviewing the backdrop of the creation of the COPS program, it 
may seem that the overarching goals the majority isolates are the primary 
goals of the program, but this limited analysis ignores the backdrop behind 
the COPS program, its rationale, and the way the recipients use the funds.  
Both the grant’s own milieu and the way it has historically been expended 
center on increasing cooperation between police officers and their 
communities, because, prior to its creation, “unstable social conditions” led to 
an “erosion of confidence” between communities and officers.219  The 
majority, while even citing to the same place in Dole as the dissent,220 fails to 
follow Dole’s command—to look at the “main purposes for which . . . funds 
are expended.”221  The majority may look at a vague description of the main 
purposes (albeit still arguable that those are purposes and not just benefits), 
but it fails to actually do the rigorous analysis that the dissent engages in to 
show what goals the funds have actually been allocated to achieve.  Thus, the 
proper description of the goals lies with the dissent—a goal to increase 
cooperation between communities and police, not merely to decrease crime 
and disorder.222 
Even if the majority’s cursory, limited analysis of the goals was accurate, 
other persuasive authority on the question of relatedness would find the 
conditions unrelated.  For example, the City of Philadelphia case noted any 
possible connection between civil immigration enforcement and deterring 
crime would not be enough to satisfy a stricter relatedness standard.223  
Further, immigration cooperation is both over- and under-inclusive in serving 
the goals of reducing crime and disorder, as well as increasing public safety.  
Justice O’Connor’s discussion of over- and under-inclusiveness in Dole 
clearly shows how the condition imposed is unrelated to the purported 
goals.224  Justice O’Connor wrote that the transportation spending conditions’ 
goal of reducing drunk driving “is far too over and under-inclusive.  It is over-
inclusive because it stops teenagers from drinking even when they are not 
about to drive on interstate highways.  It is under-inclusive because teenagers 
pose only a small part of the drunken driving problem in this Nation.”225  This 
dissenting opinion is a strong example of how the over and under-
inclusiveness test can be applied to other conditions. 
For example, the condition in the City of Los Angeles is over-inclusive 
 
 219.   City of Los Angeles, 929 F.3d at 1184 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting).  
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because it seeks to catch, jail, and deport unauthorized migrants, even when 
they are not causing crime and disorder problems.  It is under-inclusive 
because unauthorized migrants are not necessarily the ones causing crime and 
disorder problems in this country, rather research shows no causal 
connection.226  Additionally, police chiefs in some of the largest jurisdictions 
actually say that sanctuary cities “keep crime down” instead of increasing it.227  
By applying  the arguments from City of Philadelphia and the Justice 
O’Connor’s over- and under-inclusive analysis, it is clear that the conditions 
attached to COPS funding—cooperating with Trump’s anti-immigration 
policies—are not related to the COPS purpose—preventing crime and 
disorder—because being an unauthorized individual is not a crime (but rather 
a civil infraction) and they do not by-and-large cause disorder problems.  
Therefore, the conditions would likely fail the heightened relatedness prong 
and are violative of the Constitution. 
2. Comparison Analysis 
The same is true if the goals are defined as they should be—to increase 
police and community cooperation.  To start, cracking down on immigration 
does not increase cooperation or trustworthiness between police and their 
communities; rather, it decreases it.228  Police chiefs indicate enforcing 
immigration law is not their responsibility229 and are also indicating that 
cooperating with federal immigration laws “would actually make their cities 
a lot more dangerous.”230  Some officers and agencies believe that such 
cooperation with federal immigration law inhibits their communication with 
their communities, particularly “immigrants [who] are more reluctant to talk 
to police.”231  This may create a “haven for criminals to prey upon immigrants 
who are afraid to report crimes to police.”232  One county officer said that 
“gaining the trust of the immigrants who live in their communities has taken 
years of outreach” and that the efforts by the federal government to paint 
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officers as immigration officials diminishes the progress that has been 
made.233  Police chiefs across America have stated that “such efforts will have 
the unintended consequence of actually increasing crime and making their 
communities less safe” which nullifies the goals of community cooperation 
and safety behind the COPS grant program.234  Further, as stated, the goal 
behind the program is to foster positive relationships between police and their 
communities, not between police and the federal government.  The condition 
creates relationships that go in the wrong direction.  As the dissent in City of 
Los Angeles stated in its analysis on another issue, the “federal immigration 
preferences flout the clear congressional purpose of COPS grants—to 
promote partnership between local law enforcement and the communities they 
serve—by instead favoring partnerships between local police and federal 
immigration authorities.”235  Thus, there is seemingly no path by which the 
condition can reasonably serve the goals of the program. 
3. Another Possible Test 
Because the Court failed to clearly define the test of the relatedness prong, 
looking to other law may be helpful to define the test.  Importantly, takings 
jurisprudence contains a similar relatedness test in its rough proportionality 
requirement.  This test is another ends-means style constraint, making it 
potentially useful in defining the relatedness test.  There are two primary cases 
that make up and define the rough proportionality test—Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission236 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.237  In Nollan, landowners 
sued the federal government under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause238 
for inserting a condition requiring the grant of a public easement on part of 
their beachfront property.239  The Supreme Court opined that the action of 
permanently occupying land through an easement would be a taking unless it 
substantially furthered legitimate state interests.240  The Court narrowly 
defined the purpose of the program—allowing public access from points 
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inland to public beaches.241  The Court found that conditioning the grant of a 
permit on public access across the owner’s land from one public beach to 
another was not within those purposes.242 
Nollan, however, failed to define the degree of connection required 
between the conditions imposed and the impact of the proposed government 
action.243  The Court answered this question in Dolan.244  In Dolan, there was 
a permit stating the landowner had to convey part of her property to the 
government to be used for a storm drainage system and pedestrian pathway.245  
The Supreme Court found this permit condition was an impermissible taking, 
and articulated that there must be a “rough proportionality” between the 
burden on the public created by the condition and the benefit to the public by 
the conveyance of land.246  For regulatory takings of property, the Court 
established a two-prong test.  The first part requires finding an “essential 
nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the permit condition 
exacted by the city.”247  And second, the Court must decide the “required 
degree of connection.”248  The second prong requires an “individualized 
determination” regarding both the connection between the impact and the 
conditions as well as a showing of “rough proportionality” between the benefit 
and the cost.249  In parsing out the rough proportionality test, many state courts 
employ a reasonable relationship test, but the Supreme Court opted for the 
“rough proportionality” nomenclature, because they were concerned about 
confusion between the phrase “reasonable relationship” and “rational 
basis.”250  This implies rough proportionality requires more than “rational 
basis review.”251 
In Dolan, while the City passed the first prong of the “rough 
proportionality” test as the condition satisfied the goals of minimizing 
flooding, it failed the second prong of the test and was thus invalidated.252  
This was because Ms. Dolan was unreasonably forced to give away her right 
to exclude individuals on her property and the City did not show specific 
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findings to justify the paths on Dolan’s property it wanted to create.253  The 
test may not be “precisely defined,” however, its “boundaries are roughly 
marked out.”254  Because of this, the rough proportionality test may be a good 
fit for defining the relatedness test more stringently, especially because it 
requires more than simply showing a rational basis. 
If applied to the conditions in the instant case, it is unlikely that the 
immigration cooperation conditions would pass the rough proportionality test.  
On the first prong of the rough proportionality test, it is likely the federal 
government contains a valid interest in immigration enforcement because 
controlling immigration is a plenary power fairly unqualified in scope.255  
However, the trouble with the first prong is the nexus requirement—whether 
there truly is a connection between immigration enforcement and the goals of 
the COPS grant program.  Many arguments above show that these two things 
are unrelated.  While this may be a potential hurdle, assuming without 
deciding that the nexus requirement would be met, the more rigorous analysis 
comes under the rough proportionality prong.  While there is no mathematical 
formula for this prong, numbers can help guide the analysis.  It is difficult to 
understand the numbers completely, as the program for this analysis is a grant 
condition.  Thus, analyzing the amount of money Los Angeles would receive 
from the grant, versus the amount of money the community would have to 
spend on pursuing the Trump administration’s immigration goals is helpful, 
although not necessarily dispositive. 
For starters, one way to pursue immigration goals is through the § 287(g) 
agreements, as stated in the guidelines for the COPS grant.256  Because there 
has been a fair amount of research into these agreements and their costs, they 
provide a unique insight into this analysis.  Helping enforce federal 
immigration goals through these agreements can be a very costly venture.257  
For example, in 2010, one jurisdiction paid “$6.4 million annually and $25.9 
million over five years to implement its 287(g) agreement with ICE.”258  In 
other jurisdictions, the cooperation with ICE “cost taxpayers a whopping $7.9 
million and $3.2 million per year, respectively.”259  Yet, these numbers do not 
even begin to capture the whole costs of the program.  To further illustrate the 
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cost, Maricopa County, Arizona had a “$1.3 million budget deficit”260 due to 
the payments for  overtime work, and experienced “$43 million in litigation 
fees that the county was ordered to pay due to lawsuits directly related to the 
program.”261  Another tangential cost is the risk of migrant communities 
leaving the area due to arrest, deportation, or relocation.262  One study found, 
after reviewing 40 jurisdictions with these agreements, that immigrants 
provided “$66 billion in spending power and contribute $24 billion in tax 
revenue annually.”263  In all, pursuing immigration goals for jurisdictions is 
very costly, which begs the question of whether the benefit of the COPS 
program is roughly proportional. 
In the time that the government denied the Los Angeles application “the 
COPS Office awarded $98,503,539 to 179 jurisdictions for the fiscal year 
2017 application cycle.”264  Based on this number, the average amount a 
jurisdiction received during this application cycle was around $550,300.265  
Looking, for example at Prince William County, Virginia, the annual amount 
it spent to cooperate on immigration enforcement with the federal government 
was $6.4 million,266 almost twelve times the average amount gained from the 
grant in 2017.  While this is simply one example, it illustrates the fact that this 
allocation is not roughly proportional to the amount expended to pursue 
immigration goals.  It is difficult to find numbers projecting dollar amounts a 
locality gains by possible decreases in crime, which also depends on whether 
the cooperation is effective, but even a generous number would not make the 
costs roughly proportional to the benefits.  Thus, even if the program was able 
to overcome the first prong of the roughly proportional test, if based on 
numbers such as the aforementioned example, it certainly fails the second 
prong, and would be violative of the Spending Clause if this were the test for 
relatedness.  By any strengthened relatedness test, the condition is still 
unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the overwhelming evidence showing that the conditions would 
not pass a stricter relatedness test, a salient fact remains at the end of this 
analysis—relatedness has never before faced anything more than a cursory 
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analysis.267  This fact alone should not be dispositive in discrediting the 
preceding analysis.  Importantly, the Court has not defined “the outer bounds 
of the ‘germaneness’ or ‘relatedness’ limitation on the imposition of 
conditions under the spending power.”268  Accordingly, the Court in Dole did 
“not address whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose 
of the expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending power.”269  
Because the Supreme Court has explicitly failed to clearly define the 
relatedness test, it leaves the test open for the lower courts to define, or 
reinforce, as judges see fit.  Strengthening relatedness does not fly in the face 
of judicial precedent, because the Supreme Court has not defined the test in 
depth, but rather should be encouraged in future jurisprudence. 
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